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Abstract 
 
Abduction, also known as, inference to the best explanation, is employed in factual and normative 
inquiry. In this paper, I answer the question: where is the limit to abduction’s explanatory power? To 
answer this question, I examine Hobbes’s Leviathan and Descartes’s Discourse on Method. I compare 
Hobbes’s empirical beliefs about human psychology and Descartes’s micro mechanical explanations with 
Hobbes’s discussion of religion. As a result of this analysis, I argue that there is at least one case where 
religion is the limit to abduction’s explanatory power, and that case is Hobbes’s discussion of religion.       
 
 
 
Abduction, or, as it is usually called, inference to the best explanation, is employed in 
both factual and normative inquiry. Where is the limit to abduction’s explanatory 
power? In order to answer this question, I will examine Hobbes’s Leviathan and 
Descartes’s Discourse on Method. I will compare Hobbes’s empirical beliefs about 
human psychology and Descartes’s micro mechanical explanations with Hobbes’s 
discussion of religion. As a result of this analysis, I will argue that there is at least one 
case where religion is the limit to abduction’s explanatory power, and that case is 
Hobbes’s discussion of religion. 
 
Before I defend my claim, I must clarify a few concepts. First, most broadly, abduction, 
or inference to the best explanation, is a type of inference that assigns special status to 
explanatory considerations. I want to deal with abduction, however, in a more specific 
way. For the purposes of my argument, abduction is the process by which one arrives at 
a general conclusion from sensory experience that explains something about the 
universe. Although this process is explicitly adopted by Descartes in his micro 
mechanical explanations of the physical universe, Hobbes maintains that his political 
philosophy follows from axioms and logic alone. Essential to my main claim, I will 
argue that Hobbes is wrong. His political philosophy does not follow from axioms and 
logic alone but rather from beliefs about human psychology inferred from sensory 
experience. My assertion that Hobbes’s beliefs are inferred from sensory experience, 
therefore, is an abstraction. Hobbes would never say this about his own beliefs. Second, 
abduction has explanatory power because it provides a reasonable conclusion for 
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reasonable people. In other words, based off of observation, abduction’s goal is to posit 
an explanation that makes the most sense and seems reasonable. 
 
Descartes’s physics exemplifies the explanatory power of abduction in factual inquiry. 
In part five of Discourse on Method, Descartes employs abduction in order to 
investigate the laws of nature. While explaining light, Descartes “explained at some 
length what this light was that had to be found in the sun and the stars, and how from 
thence it travelled in an instant across the immense spaces of the heavens, and how it 
was reflected from the planets and comets to earth” (Descartes, Discourse on Method 
24). Descartes explains light by examining his own observations of the sun and stars’ 
light and arriving at a conclusion that both explains his observations and seems 
reasonable, namely that light must travel in an instant across the heavens. Descartes’s 
method of inquiry clearly employs abduction. But, so what? Inference to the best 
explanation is typical of scientific inquiry, and it is so intuitively. Making hypotheses 
about our observations of the world is the most commonly accepted scientific 
methodology. Abduction’s explanatory power is not limited by factual or scientific 
inquiry. 
 
Hobbes’s political philosophy demonstrates the explanatory power of abduction in 
normative inquiry. Hobbes’s political claims are justified by his empirical beliefs about 
human psychology. In Ch. 13 of Hobbes’s Leviathan, Hobbes makes empirical claims 
about human psychology. Although Hobbes attempts to deduce his claims from logic 
and axioms alone, he cannot. His claims, instead, are beliefs about human psychology 
inferred from sensory experience. Hobbes’s assertion that “the weakest has strength 
enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with 
others, that are in the same danger with himselfe” does not follow from his definitions 
or axioms (Hobbes 87). It follows from his personal experience. After observing the 
weak conspire with each other to take down the strong, Hobbes arrived at a conclusion 
that best explained his observations. Although abduction’s explanatory power is more 
controversial and less intuitively obvious in normative than factual or scientific inquiry, 
in the case of Hobbes’s political philosophy, abduction’s explanatory power is not 
limited by normative inquiry. 
 
Hobbes does not employ abduction in his discussion of religion. In Ch. 32 of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, Hobbes discusses religion and the appropriate methodology for discovering 
truths about religious practice. Hobbes says that when inquiring after religious truths, 
“we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words; and not to labour in sifting 
out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor 
fall under any rule of naturall science” (Hobbes 256). Here, Hobbes means that 
although we should not wholly disregard reason or experience when discussing 
religion, we should not employ logic or scientific method to discover truths about 
religion. 
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Does this mean that in the case of Hobbes’s discussion of religion, abduction’s 
explanatory power is limited by religious inquiry? Yes, and there are three possible 
angles to take in order to make this argument. It is important to note that Hobbes does 
not explicitly say these things about his own beliefs. Similar to my earlier claim that 
Hobbes’s political claims are justified by his empirical beliefs about human 
psychology, these three different angles are abstractions. They explain Hobbes’s 
discussion of religion the best. First, Hobbes is not concerned with religion in the same 
way that he is concerned with political philosophy and natural science. He believes that 
there is no fact of the matter about religion and that religion is a matter of opinion. 
Religious truths, for Hobbes, are little t truths not capital T truths. They are a matter of 
opinion and not facts about the world as it really is. Furthermore, Hobbes does not 
employ abduction in his discussion of religion because religious truths, or opinions, are 
not conclusions that best explain sensory experience.  
 
Second, Hobbes believes that there should be a distinction between religious and 
scientific inquiry. Like Galileo, Hobbes believes that science and religion are 
compatible and ultimately serve different purposes. In other words, scientific inquiry 
concerns the explanation of natural phenomena and sensory experience, while religion 
concerns salvation. Because they are concerned with different things, they do not 
conflict with each other. Hobbes, then, does not employ abduction in his discussion of 
religion because religion is not concerned with explaining natural phenomena and 
sensory experience. 
 
Third, Hobbes believes that religion is simply dogma. According to Hobbes, “it is with 
the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed 
whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without 
effect” (ibid). In other words, religious truths should be accepted without reason or 
evidence. One should just follow what one’s sovereign says about religious truths and 
doctrine. Hobbes does not want opposing religious factions to start a civil war and 
destabilize the commonwealth. In this way, Hobbes is conventional; he sees no reason 
to inquire into the truths of religion. Hobbes does not employ abduction in his 
discussion of religion both because it makes no sense to him to explain dogma and 
because he does not want the results of religious inquiry to destabilize the 
commonwealth. Furthermore, this angle allows Hobbes to solve the problem of 
religious duties forbidding one’s submission to a sovereign. He gets out of this problem 
by saying that one should just submit to the religion of the commonwealth, thus 
remaining both religious and obedient to the sovereign. Coming from all three angles, 
in the case of Hobbes’s discussion of religion, abduction’s explanatory is limited by 
religious inquiry. 
 
I must now reply to four possible objections to my argument. First, according to my 
second angle, Hobbes does not employ abduction in his discussion of religion because 
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conclusions from sensory experience that explain something about the universe cannot 
answer questions about salvation. This contradicts my claim that in the case of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy, abduction’s explanatory power is not limited by 
normative inquiry. In at least one possible view of salvation, one has to live according 
to religious life and abide by a moral code in order to be saved. Religious inquiry, then, 
would be normative in nature. And, according to me, abduction’s explanatory power is 
not limited by normative inquiry. Hobbes should be able to employ abduction in order 
to inquire into religious truths concerning salvation. I do not think that this objection 
hurts my argument. The reason why this objection does not hurt my argument is 
because there is a distinction between prescriptive political claims and dogma. Hobbes 
makes prescriptive claims about politics based off of his observation. For instance, he 
posits that one should enter into a social contract and submit to a sovereign in order to 
leave the state of nature, where men are egocentric and there is a “war of all against 
all.” The prescriptive claims in salvation, however, such as the moral code that one 
must abide by in order to be saved, are not based off of observation. They are dogma, 
prescribed to believers without any evidence or justification from observation. Hobbes 
does not employ abduction in the discussion of dogma. So, it would make no sense for 
him to employ abduction in the discussion of salvation. 
 
Second, Hobbes got it wrong. Others, like Descartes got it right. So, although Hobbes’s 
discussion of religion does limit abduction’s explanatory power, my claim is 
insignificant because Hobbes was incorrect. Contrary to Hobbes, Descartes does not 
think that religious inquiry limits the explanatory power of abduction. In the Fifth 
Meditation of his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes employs abduction in 
order to formulate a proof of the existence of God. According to Descartes, “from the 
mere fact that I can bring forth from my thought the idea of something, it follows that 
all that I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, 
then cannot this too be a basis for the argument proving the existence of God” 
(Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy 88)? In other words, Descartes believes 
that the existence of God best explains and follows from his observations. It is 
important here not to be fooled by Descartes’s language. He doesn’t intend for his 
argument to resemble a mathematical proof. Instead, Descartes relies on his intuition to 
arrive at a reasonable conclusion. I have two things to say in response. First, even if 
Hobbes is wrong, my argument still holds. My argument merely claims that Hobbes 
believes that abduction’s explanatory power is limited by religious inquiry. I do not 
take a stand on whether or not he is correct. Second, I agree that Descartes does not 
believe that abduction’s explanatory power is limited by religious inquiry. I think it is 
beneficial to compare the two. And, although it is not the job of my argument, I think 
there is a lot to learn from the comparison of the two about the intersection of religion 
and science.  
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Third, Hobbes is not sincere. He uses irony and other rhetorical devices to undermine 
his readers’ religious beliefs. His insincerity about religion calls into question his belief 
that the explanatory power of abduction is limited by religious inquiry. I have two 
things to say about this. First, this does not hurt my argument. In fact, it only reinforces 
it. If Hobbes is, indeed, insincere in order to undermine religious belief, he certainly 
does not think that abduction or scientific method can explain religious issues. This 
objection is entirely consistent with my first angle. If it were true that Hobbes was 
insincere, one reason would be that he thinks that religious truths are little t truths, or 
opinions. He, then, would think both that we should not waste our time with the 
dogmatic opinions of religion and that abduction is limited by religious inquiry. 
Second, although I do not wish to take a stand on whether or not Hobbes is not sincere, 
I think this objection faces serious problems. How can it account for the sheer amount 
of time Hobbes spends on his discussion of religion in his Leviathan? Hobbes would 
not have spent so much time discussing religion if he had not been so concerned with 
religious belief. Could it be because he is so insistent that we not be religious? This, 
however, cannot be right, since Hobbes views religion as another opportunity for us to 
submit to our commonwealth and sovereign. 
 
Fourth, so what? Okay, I have shown that in at least one case abduction’s explanatory 
power is limited by religion. This is obvious. Religion’s explanations of the universe 
are not subject to logic or the scientific method and no one expects them to be. People 
believe in miracles and supernatural beings not because they most reasonably explain 
something about the world, but because they do just the opposite. Religion deals with 
hope and salvation, not physics or politics. My argument is, therefore, trivially true. I 
think this is wrong. My argument is not trivially true. Philosophers and scientists have 
tried to explain religious truths for centuries. Leibniz employed logic and axioms alone 
in order to provide a solution for the problem of evil. Descartes and many others used 
scientific methods to prove the existence of God. Even scientists today put forward 
evidence which they believe can only be reasonably explained by the existence of God. 
My claim provides an insight that not only is not trivially true but addresses a major 
controversy today. 
 
What can we learn from my argument? It is intuitive and not interesting that abduction 
is employed in and is not limited by scientific inquiry. Scientists make hypotheses 
about their observations every day; it’s what they do. It is less intuitive and more 
interesting that abduction is not limited by normative inquiry or prescriptive claims. 
This, too, however, we have a firm grasp on. The methodological legitimacy of ethics 
and political science is largely uncontroversial. Abduction in religion, however, is very 
controversial. Does scientific methodology have a place in religious inquiry? Everyone 
from Galileo to Descartes to Dawkins have had different, coherent answers to this 
question. I have pinpointed at least one case, Hobbes’s discussion of religion, where 
scientific methodology is limited by religious inquiry. What can we do with this claim? 
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Although the job of another argument, we should evaluate whether or not Hobbes is 
correct that religion limits scientific methodology. This evaluation will inform the 
solution to the problem of science’s place in religious inquiry. Furthermore, Why does 
he spend so much time on his discussion of religion if religion is merely a matter of 
opinion and not central to his philosophical project? Interpreters of Hobbes must 
continue to deal with Hobbes’s obvious concern with religious belief. 
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